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ABSTRACT
Shareholder action is exercised mainly through a binary system: for
example, the shareholders vote either to approve a proposal or to reject it.
They either follow the recommendation of management and vote with
management or vote against it. In case of contention between incumbents
and insurgents, shareholders need to determine whom to trust. Disclosures
and proxy advisory firms’ recommendations add to the information the
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shareholders might consider before casting their binary vote. However, retail
investors as well as small investors are generally underequipped and
restricted economically from reaching an informed and educated shareholder
decision, and thus vote infrequently. Abuse of insider information further
disadvantages retail investors. Yet, corporate decisions are based on the
choice of the majority of the shareholder vote, and retail investors are
assumed to rely on disclosed information when making investment
decisions.
The new generation of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies
(SPACs), currently representing about half of the U.S. going-public
transactions, is one example that illustrates the weakness of the binary
system and the consequent vulnerability of small and unsophisticated
shareholders. Remarkably, investors in SPACs can vote “yes” on
management proposed acquisition transactions and nonetheless,
simultaneously choose to redeem their shares. Unsophisticated retail
investors may not realize that they will also be better off if they redeem their
shares even though the transaction received the approval of the majority of
the shareholder vote.
This Article puts forward a proposal to amend the law and allow
shareholders to act in a way that is contingent on a simultaneous noncontingent action by other shareholders. For example, a shareholder of a
SPAC should be able to choose to redeem her shares if and only if at least a
specified percentage of redemption rights are exercised unconditionally.
Similarly, a shareholder who has preemptive rights should have the right to
exercise her rights with a limit that caps her participation and maintains her
percentage holdings in the company.
Generally, shareholders should have the option to act contingently
when they are exercising a shareholder right, such as preemptive rights or
appraisal rights, and when they are given a choice to participate in
transactions such as tender offers and stock-buybacks. Unlike mandatory
disclosure rules imposed on insiders, the proposed non-binary, contingent,
shareholder action treats all shareholders equally and increases the power of
the shareholder’s action without incurring high costs of collaboration and
communication among the shareholders.
INTRODUCTION
Shareholder action is mostly binary: the shareholders are required to
take a side, in favor of or against a proposed action.1 However, the apparent
1. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(b) (2020) (“Each stockholder entitled to vote at a
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benefit of having a simple system with only two choices is illusory.2
Shareholders may be rationally passive, especially when it involves small
individual investors, which may present a major challenge to corporations
and corporate governance.3 The average shareholder of a public company
may find it prohibitively expensive to make an educated, informed decision
on how to use their shareholder power.4 On the other hand, controlling
shareholders, insiders, and management may abuse the rational ignorance
and inaction of the retail shareholders.5
This Article proposes a novel solution to mitigate the risk of shareholder
abuse and shareholder collective action problems – contingent shareholder
action. The proposal borrows from ancient democracy, when the voting
process was open to the public and citizens could see how everyone votes in
the people’s assembly and adjust their own vote based on the observed
behavior of the group.6 Contingent shareholder action allows shareholders
to act based on the simultaneous actions of other shareholders. Specifically,
the proposal allows shareholders to follow the acts of shareholders who act
unconditionally. For example, under the proposal, a shareholder may choose
to vote “yes” on a shareholder resolution, provided that the majority of the
unconditional votes were cast in favor of the resolution. The contingent vote
may also incorporate a specified threshold of percentage of votes that the
shareholder chooses to follow. For example, the shareholder may vote “yes”
provided that at least 30% of the total shareholder votes are cast “yes”
unconditionally.
meeting of stockholders or to express consent or dissent to corporate action in writing without
a meeting may authorize another person or persons to act for such stockholder by proxy. . . .”).
(emphasis added).
2. Cf. generally Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Disclosures for Corporate and Other Law
(Univ. Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. L. & Econ., Research Paper No, 884, 2019) (analyzing the
efficiency of binary rules and demonstrating the often impracticality of legal discontinuities).
3. See generally Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV.
520 (1990) (describing and analyzing shareholder collective action and passivity and the
related incentives).
4. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1443 (1989) (“Investors are rationally uninterested in votes, not only
because no investor’s vote will change the outcome of the election but also because the
information necessary to cast an informed vote is not readily available.”).
5. For an analysis of the interaction and tradeoff between a controlling shareholder
policing management on the one hand and extracting private benefits of control on the other
hand, see generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling
Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785 (2003).
6. Cf. Lisa M. Fairfax, Virtual Shareholder Meetings Reconsidered, 40 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1367, 1391–94 (2010) (suggesting that actual shareholder presence in shareholder
meetings, rather than virtual and remote meetings, allows for interaction and dialogue
between managers and shareholders, and among shareholders).
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Shareholder vulnerability to insiders may not always be cured by
mandatory prior disclosure of the insiders’ votes or their approval of a
corporate action. To be sure, insiders’ votes may serve as an important signal
to retail investors. Yet, a vote in favor of, or an approval and support of, a
corporate action, is often separate and distinct from the choice to participate
and exercise one’s right as a shareholder. This Article analyzes two
examples that demonstrate this distinction. The case of shareholder
redemption rights in Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) is the
first example. The case of shareholder preemptive rights is the second
example.
In the last couple of years, SPACs have gained increased popularity and
importance, especially in the energy sector.7 During this short period,
SPACs have raised a significant amount of funds as they have enjoyed the
support of well-known professionals, as well as private equity funds.8 In
fact, in 2019, about one in three U.S. going-public transactions were SPACs,9
and that ratio grew dramatically to one in two transactions following the
declaration of the coronavirus pandemic.10 However, unsophisticated
7. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
8. Id.; James Thorne, SPAC Surge Points to Shifting IPO Landscape, PITCHBOOK (May
26, 2020), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/spac-surge-points-to-shifting-ipo-landscapeand-video [https://perma.cc/X986-NEA2] (“[P]rivate equity giants TPG Capital and The
Carlyle Group as well as investment banks such as Goldman Sachs have sponsored SPACs.”);
Nicholas Jasinski, Bill Ackman’s Pershing Square Files for Largest-Ever SPAC IPO,
BARRON’S (June 22, 2020), https://www.barrons.com/articles/bill-ackmans-pershing-squarefiles-for-largest-ever-spac-ipo-51592857837 [https://perma.cc/G49B-MMME] (“Goldman
Sachs, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, and Citigroup have all underwritten SPAC IPOs in
recent years. TPG Capital, Apollo Global Management, Third Point, and Blackstone have
each acted as SPAC sponsors.”).
9. See, e.g., 2019 Annual Capital Markets Watch, PWC, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/se
rvices/deals/library/us-capital-markets-watch.html?WT.mc_id=CT3-PL300-DM1-TR1-LS4
0-ND40-TTA1-CN_Deals-Capital-Market-2020-Google&eq=CT3-PL300-DM1-CN_DealsCapital-Market-2020-Google&gclid=EAIaIQobChMI-ai84tOX5wIVf__jBx3GYwdSEAAY
ASAAEgJW6fD_BwE [https://perma.cc/26BM-DYXK] (last updated Feb. 11, 2020,
23:15:14 UTC) (“The number of SPACs continued to increase in 2019 . . . to 30% . . . in terms
of the total share of annual IPOs. SPACs led in volume three out of four quarters in 2019.”);
Jacob Rund, Surge in SPAC Listings Offers Big Business to Select Law Firms, BLOOMBERG
LAW (Dec. 6, 2019, 4:30 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X4VALQOC000
000?bna_news_filter=securities-law&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016e4cb9de8ca77e6df979d
20001#jcite [https://perma.cc/DJ72-F5L8]. Blackstone, for example, chose a $5.6 billion
SPAC deal, rather than a traditional IPO, for Vivint. Crystal Tse & Liana Baker, ‘BlankCheck’ Deals Get New Look After High-Profile IPO Flops, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 23, 2019, 1:44
PM CST), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-23/spacs-get-a-shiny-new-loo
k-after-high-profile-ipo-flops [https://perma.cc/SA9E-LL3T].
10. See, e.g., Melia Russell, Inside the Unstoppable Rise of ‘Blank-Check Companies,’ a
Type of Business that has No Operations and Can Still Float an IPO Amidst a Recession,
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investors in SPACs might be misguided by a favorable shareholder vote that
includes the sophisticated investors’ votes in support of transactions
promoted by the management of the SPAC. As this Article shows,
sophisticated investors may well decide to vote for the transaction and,
nonetheless, exercise their redemption rights, returning their shares to the
SPAC for a refund.11
Similarly, preemptive rights are special shareholder rights that may
mitigate the important problem of cheap stock tunneling transactions,
transactions that insiders use to extract value to themselves and away from
the company by allowing the right-holder to participate in new issuances of
stock.12 However, as Jesse Fried and Holger Spamann show, insiders might
take advantage of uninformed outside investors who are faced with the
decision whether to exercise their preemptive rights.13 While the issuance of
new stock may not even require a shareholder vote,14 it is not the approval of
the new shares but rather the insider’s choice whether to participate in the
new issuance that is informative for the outside shareholders.15
Mandatory disclosure rules that require insiders to reveal their chosen
action may help reduce shareholder vulnerability to insiders.16 The proposed
contingent shareholder action is similar to mandatory disclosure rules in that
both allow the retail shareholders to benefit from the choices made by other
BUSINESS INSIDER (May 16, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/spac-blank-check-comp
anies-explained-2020-5?utm_source=dowjones&utm_medium=ingest [https://perma.cc/NM
9J-Q7T5] (“Since the coronavirus outbreak was declared a pandemic on March 11, 13 of the
24 companies that entered the public market through an IPO have been blank-check
companies.”); Thorne, supra note 8 (“SPACs are dominating the IPO scene—and some
investors believe a recession could lead to more of them.”).
11. See infra Part III.A.
12. Jesse M. Fried, Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure, in THE
LAW AND FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 79, 80–81 (Luca Enriques & Tobias H.
Tröger eds., 2019); Jesse M. Fried & Holger Spamann, Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around
Preemptive Rights 2–3 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Law Working Paper No. 408/2018,
2019).
13. Fried, supra note 12 (“[P]reemptive rights can prevent cheap-issuance tunneling
when outsiders know that the offered securities are cheap. However, I show that preemptive
rights fail to prevent such tunneling when outsiders cannot tell whether the offered securities
are cheap or overpriced.”).
14. Mira Ganor, The Power to Issue Stock, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 701, 702 (2011).
15. Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through
Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 323–25 (1998).
16. Cf. Id. at 348–64 (proposing a mandatory advance disclosure requirement on trading
by insiders); Jesse M. Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender
Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 470–73 (2000) (proposing a mandatory advance disclosure
requirement on controlling shareholders in the case of Repurchase Tender Offers); Fried,
supra note 12, at 96–103 (proposing a mandatory advance disclosure requirement on
controlling shareholders in the case of preemptive rights).
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shareholders and follow these choices. Contingent shareholder action,
however, is superior to disclosure requirements in that it does not require
advanced disclosure by select shareholders. Contingent shareholder action
treats all shareholders equally and allows for simultaneous action by all
shareholders, while letting shareholders follow those who decide to act
unconditionally.
Another form of contingent shareholder action is a shareholder action
that includes a limit on the participation of the shareholder. Where the
shareholder has the right to participate in rights offers and buyback offers,
for example, exercising the shareholder right with a limit ensures that the
shareholder maintains her percentage holding in the company. Thus, the
shareholder can prevent economic dilution of her investment.
In addition to solving issues of abuse of insider information, contingent
shareholder action can solve problems of coordination among shareholders
and of collective action. For example, shareholders can tender shares
contingent on the tender offer receiving a sufficient number of shares to close
the offer without counting shares that are tendered contingently. Such a
contingent act could eliminate coercive aspects of a tender offer.17 In the
case of a hostile offer, the contingent action could eliminate the reliance on
management to apply defensive tactics to protect shareholders from a low,
coercive bid and might also prevent management from using the tender offer
as an excuse to implement excessive defenses to protect the shareholders.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I offers a concise discussion on
the current regime governing shareholder action. Part II puts forward the
contingent shareholder action proposal as an alternative to the binary regime.
The proposed contingent shareholder action regime is enabling—it allows
each shareholder to choose whether to follow other shareholders but does not
require shareholders to do so. This Part also compares and contrasts
contingent shareholder action with shareholder abstention. Finally, this Part
explores the desirability of the proposed contingent shareholder action
17. For an example of claims of coercion in the context of controlling shareholder tender
offers, see Supplement to the Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 12, In re Genentech,
Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 3911-VCS (Del. Ch. Feb 19, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/Arc
hives/edgar/data/318771/000095010309000440/dp12679_ex-a5xxxxii.htm [https://perma.cc
/HS63-GJEX] (“Roche attempts to coerce Genentech’s minority stockholders into tendering
their shares . . . by failing to provide certainty about the process by which the second-step
merger will be accomplished and at what price. . . . Roche simply cannot know the price at
which a second-step merger can be effected following the Offer, prior to the process required
by the Affiliation Agreement, rendering the Offer coercive and subject to entire fairness
scrutiny. Moreover, the Offer is subject to a financing condition, and Roche needs $42.1
billion to finance the Offer and the second-step merger. Roche has not demonstrated that it
will have enough money even to finance the second-step merger.”).
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regime from the perspective of investors who act unconditionally, without
regard to the choices of the other investors. Part III demonstrates the
potential benefit of a contingent shareholder action regime in two distinct
cases. The first case is that of redemption rights, especially in the context of
the new generation of SPACs. The second case explored in Part III, as an
example for the efficacy of a contingent shareholder action regime, is the
case of preemptive rights. The following Part IV compares and contrasts the
contingent shareholder action regime and mandatory disclosure rules. In
Part V, the Article considers strategic circumvention of the contingent
shareholder action regime and ways to prevent it. A conclusion follows.
I.

SHAREHOLDER ACTION

Shareholder action is generally binary: ultimately a “yes” or a “no”
decision. Shareholders face binary choices such as whether or not to exercise
their appraisal rights, redeem their shares, participate in a tender offer,18 sell
shares back to the company, and vote “yes” or “no” on a shareholder
proposal.19 Shareholder action requires the approval of the holders of the
majority of the votes, a supermajority, or in special cases, the majority of the
minority.20 A unanimous vote is seldom required, except for extreme
transactions such as liquidation without board approval21 and corporate
waste.22 A majority vote, rather than a unanimous vote requirement, may
18. See, e.g., Tender Offer, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-invest
ing/investing-basics/glossary/tender-offer [https://perma.cc/PGS8-MEV2] (last modified Jan.
16, 2013) (“A tender offer is a widespread solicitation by a company or third party to purchase
a substantial percentage of the company’s securities . . . for a limited period of time.”).
19. The option to withhold vote in the plurality voting system is the second choice
available to shareholders. Abstaining from voting, on the other hand, may be viewed as a
third option, which has similar results to a “no” vote in case a majority of votes of the
outstanding shares is required. For further discussion on abstaining from voting and vote
withholding, see infra text accompanying notes 49–53.
20. The affirmative vote of the majority of the minority shareholders may be required in
order to avoid the entire fairness standard of review in the case of a transaction with a
controlling shareholder. E.g., Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 646 (Del. 2014);
Olenik v. Lodzinski, 208 A.3d 704, 706 (Del. 2019). Fundamental transactions, such as
mergers and sales of all or substantially all of the assets of the corporation, require approval
of the holders of the majority of the outstanding shares, rather than merely the majority of the
vote cast. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 271 (2020); see also In re PNB Holding Co.
S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 28-N, 2006 WL 2403999, at *15 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006)
(explaining that a shareholder who abstains from voting on a merger is casting a “de facto no
vote” and can be viewed as part of a “passive dissent” rather than part of “a ‘silent affirmative
majority of the minority’”).
21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(c) (2020).
22. E.g., Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 335 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“[S]hareholders may
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prevent holdout costs, a situation in which a shareholder with minimal
interest in the firm extracts disproportionate benefits in exchange for her
consent.
However, shareholders may not know how to cast their votes. The
shareholders may have to choose between incumbents and insurgents
competing for their votes. Even where there is no opposition to management,
the shareholders may be faced with a difficult choice of whether or not to
acquiesce to management’s request. Sophisticated shareholders may invest
in research about the requested shareholder action. In addition, proxy
advisory firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and GlassLewis, are likely to advise institutional investors how to vote their shares,
while retail investors will not receive such advice.23 The benefit of such
advice might be limited, however, as proxy advisory firms were recently
criticized for lack of adequate oversight.24
Unsurprisingly, since making an educated shareholder decision will
likely entail additional costs, most retail investors, who own small personal
stakes in corporations, do not participate in corporate elections25 and are
blamed for being apathetic.26 Nonetheless, their votes may be pivotal for the
future of the company, especially where there is disagreement between
management and insurgents, or among different groups of sophisticated
investors, or when a high percentage of the votes is required.27 Brokers
not ratify a waste except by a unanimous vote.”).
23. Cf. Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail
Investor, 102 MINN. L. REV. 11, 21–22 (2017) (“ISS is perhaps best known for its advisory
services; it provides its investor-subscribers with information about issues on which they are
being asked to vote, as well as recommendations as to how to vote.”).
24. E.g., Ted Knutson, Proxy Advisory Firms Get Shotgun Treatment From Wall Street,
FORBES (Apr. 26, 2018, 4:28 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tedknutson/2018/04/26/prox
y-advisory-firms-get-shotgun-treatment-from-wall-street/#36931321366c [https://perma.cc/
4L5L-F9DY] (“The study charged the services are fraught with poor transparency, conflicts
of interest and a lack of communication with the companies they’re reviewing.”); Stephen J.
Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 649, 650 (2009) (“Proxy advisors are depicted as powerful, yet unaccountable,
institutions that can sway the outcome of corporate votes without any of their own money at
stake.”).
25. Christopher P. Skroupa, Retail Shareholders – They’re Not Voting, And It’s An Issue,
SKYTOP STRATEGIES (May 16, 2018), https://www.skytopstrategies.com/retail-shareholderstheyre-not-voting-issue/ [https://perma.cc/T36J-FEWR] (“Less than a third of retail
shareholders vote in corporate elections.”).
26. Id. at 3. (“We work on campaigns for companies and mutual funds where retail
investors dominate the share registry yet are apathetic about voting.”).
27. Id. (“Retail shareholders need to [be] aware that their votes matter . . . there are issues
where . . . institutional investors may be divided and the retail vote could impact the outcome.
This impact is especially true for proposals relating to say-on-pay and director elections. . . .
Moreover, retail votes can determine the outcome of a proxy contest, often deciding the
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cannot step in and mitigate the problem by voting on behalf of the retail
shareholders who did not send them voting instructions.28 In the case of
material issues, issues which are not defined as “routine items,” the
beneficial shareholders have to instruct their brokers how to vote on their
behalf.29
Thus, we rely on the holders of the majority of the votes, who include
retail investors, “mom and pop” investors, who are usually unsophisticated,
and who lack the incentive or financial ability to invest in acquiring relevant
information and conduct research to guide their vote.30 Sophisticated
investors’ votes are assigned the same weight as the retail investors’ votes,
composition of the board and the direction of a company.”). The importance of shareholder
participation is growing; lately, there have even been calls to raise the threshold needed for
resubmission of precatory shareholder resolutions. E.g., Lydia DePillis, Shareholder Activism
is on the Rise, But Companies are Fighting Back, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/30/in
vesting/activist-shareholders/index.html [https://perma.cc/WTM6-KQRG] (last updated Jan.
31, 2019, 4:04 AM ET) (“Along with Nasdaq, the Business Roundtable, and the Chamber of
Commerce’s longstanding Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, the coalition has been
pushing for legislation that would raise the threshold of support needed to re-submit a
resolution that failed previously.”); see also Fisch, supra note 23, at 12–13 (pointing to the
2015 proxy contest at DuPont as an example for the power of retail investors to “have a
meaningful effect on the outcome of a shareholder vote.”); Michael Flaherty, P&G, Peltz Vie
for Small Investor Votes in Biggest-Ever Proxy Fight, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2017, 6:13 AM), ht
tps://www.reuters.com/article/us-procter-gamble-trian-investors/pg-peltz-vie-for-small-inve
stor-votes-in-biggest-ever-proxy-fight-idUSKCN1C01CW [https://perma.cc/EG9T-87XN]
(“The largest corporate proxy fight in history, between Procter & Gamble Co . . . and activist
investor Nelson Peltz, may ultimately be decided by small shareholders. . . . The majority of
votes for or against the nomination of Peltz . . . to P&G’s board will be cast by massive index
investors such as Vanguard Group Inc. . . . But small shareholders could tip the balance in a
tight vote.”); Scott Hirst, Frozen Charters, 34 YALE J. ON REGUL. 91, 112–16 (2017)
(highlighting the challenges of securing sufficient shareholder votes to facilitate charter
amendments).
28. Hirst, supra note 27, at 99–122 (describing and analyzing the broker voting process,
the broker voting rules, and the challenges that they raise); Fisch, supra note 23, at 13 (“By
January 2012, brokers were barred from exercising discretionary voting authority with respect
to uncontested director elections, say-on-pay, and charter and bylaw amendments.”).
29. Investor Bulletin: Voting in Annual Shareholder Meetings - What’s New in 2012, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 2 (Mar. 2012), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/votinginannualsh
areholdersmeetings.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HFD-86WH] (“Brokers are only allowed to cast
uninstructed broker votes on ‘routine’ items, and the scope of routine items has narrowed over
the years.”).
30. Cf. John Armour, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic
Governance Structure of Public Corporations: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, in
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 49, 49 n.1
(Oxford Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2017) (“Shareholder ‘coordination and information costs’ can be
understood as the costs of actually making decisions among multiple shareholders (i.e. of
getting informed and forging a majority preference), combined with the costs flowing from
such decisions being suboptimal (because shareholders are uninformed or conflicted).”).

2021]

NON-BINARY, CONTINGENT, SHAREHOLDER ACTION

399

unless the company’s capital structure includes a separate class of shares
with superior voting rights.31 Such dual class capital structures can delegate
the decision-making power to those who may know more, as in the case of
Google.32 To be sure, a wealthy individual may own a larger stake of a
company than a less wealthy individual and because of the larger stake may
have a larger influence on the company; however, the stake of the company
of the less wealthy individual may represent a higher percentage of her
wealth and thus, she may be more vested in the success of the company than
the wealthier individual.33 Wealth may be associated with financial skills, or
at least allows an investor to hire financial advisors.34 Potentially, wealth
may also increase the likelihood of a conflict of interest as sophisticated
advisors of the wealthy investor are likely to encourage diversification and
the use of various hedging techniques to lower the investment risk.35
Nonetheless, generally, under the default rule, the majority of the
31. See, e.g., Mira Ganor, Why Do Dual-Class Firms Have Staggered Boards?, 10 OHIO
ST. BUS. L.J. 147, 154 (2016) (explaining the structure and advantages of a dual-class capital
structure).
32. See, e.g., Google, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at iii (Apr. 29, 2004),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/ds1.htm [https://p
erma.cc/ZE4D-3DT9] (“The main effect of this [dual class voting] structure is likely to leave
our team, especially Sergey [Brin] and me [Larry Page], with significant control over the
company’s decisions and fate, as Google shares change hands. New investors will fully share
in Google’s long-term growth but will have less influence over its strategic decisions than
they would at most public companies.”).
33. Even if both invest the same percentage of their wealth in the company, the
importance (or utility value) that the less wealthy investor assigns to her stake in the company
may well be higher than the one that the wealthier investor assigns because of decreased
marginal utility. In addition, wealth may be negatively correlated with risk aversion. Cf. Mira
Ganor, Agency Costs in the Era of Economic Crisis – The Enhanced Connection Between
CEO Compensation and Corporate Cash Holdings, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 105, 108 (2013)
(“[F]ollowing the economic crisis, managerial behavior changed to correspond to adjustments
in the manager’s level of risk. And the manager’s level of risk is positively correlated with
her compensation.”).
34. Cf. The federal securities law allows accredited investors, investors whose annual
income or net worth are above specified thresholds, to participate in securities offering that
are considered risky and thus not open to the public at large, because the wealth of accredited
investors is viewed as an indication of them being “financially sophisticated and able to fend
for themselves or sustain the risk of loss, thus rendering unnecessary the protections that come
from a registered offering.” Updated Investor Bulletin: Accredited Investors, INVESTOR.GOV
(Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/u
pdated-investor-bulletin-accredited-investors [https://perma.cc/J3WA-N78H].
35. See generally Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 823–49 (2006) (showing
through case studies that investment advisors employed various exotic trading strategies such
as zero-cost collar options, record date capture, and equity swaps, to either increase voting
rights or to deny voting rights through more complex investment vehicles).
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shareholder vote is required for a shareholder action. This rule may be
efficient if a large number of shareholders voting on an action increases the
likelihood of a better decision.36 This argument is analogous to the common
rationale behind democratic voting. It is also similar to the requirement of a
number of judges sitting on a panel in appeal cases rather than a single judge
in trial cases, and to the use of an en banc session of the court rather than
fewer judges in a panel session. Based on the law of large numbers, this may
help reach a correct decision in higher likelihood.37 However, in contrast to
fairly equally sophisticated and trained judges, the shareholder base of a
company typically includes investors with varied levels of sophistication,
including retail investors who might lack any business acumen or financial
means to hire educated advisors. Furthermore, the sophistication of certain
shareholders may well come with an extraordinary cost of a conflict of
interest.38
In addition, while it is assumed that the deliberation of a panel of judges
will increase the court’s capacity to reach a correct outcome, generally when
the size of a group is excessively increased, this effect is decreased and in
fact, may become a disadvantage. For comparison, studies of the size of the
board of directors of companies suggest a declined efficiency with the
increase in the number of directors serving on the board.39 Empirical
evidence links the size of the board with reduced monitoring and reduced
firm profitability.40 Similarly, the size of the shareholder body of a public
36. See, e.g., Zohar Goshen, Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or Liability
Rule?, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 741, 745 (1997) (“Preference accorded to the majority’s opinion is
not based on ideological factors but on simple probability. The majority view is preferable
because it is more likely to be correct.”).
37. E.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J.
82, 116 (1986) (“Our analysis of the relationship between court size and accuracy is not
definitive, but it does indicate that adding judges improves accuracy under plausibly
optimistic assumptions about the general capacity of judges to reach correct outcomes and
about the impact of deliberation on this capacity.”).
38. See Hu & Black, supra note 35, at 823–49 (“On the one hand, insider hedging may
mitigate the risk-taking conflict between managers and diversified shareholders. But the same
technology could allow insiders to boost their voting control at little economic risk, thus
weakening the market for corporate control as a disciplining mechanism.”).
39. See generally Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the
Failure of Internal Control Systems, 6 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 4, 19–20 (1994) (suggesting that
larger boards are more easily controlled by the CEO because of coordination and process
problems).
40. E.g., Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an
Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, 9 ECON. POL’Y
REV. 7, 13 (2003) (“The data therefore appear to reveal a fairly clear picture: board size and
firm value are negatively correlated.”); David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation for Firms
with a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185, 186 (1996) (summarizing the literature
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company prohibits deliberation among the shareholders even if they
physically attend the shareholder meeting. Since the shareholder body is
comprised of a much larger number of members than that of the board, the
problem of coordinating and collaborating among the shareholders and
overcoming each single member’s rational incentive to freeride and rely on
the others’ actions is more pronounced. On the other hand, following the
herd allows unsophisticated investors to learn from those who are
sophisticated and better informed.
II.

CONTINGENT SHAREHOLDER ACTION (CSA)

This Article refers to a shareholder’s choice between two options that
is decisive and unrelated to the choices of the other shareholders as a binary
shareholder action. For example, a binary shareholder voting system allows
the shareholder to either vote in favor of or against a proposal. To be sure,
the shareholder may choose not to vote, or generally not to act, but if she
chooses to vote (or to act) then the vote has to be either in favor or against.
In contrast to binary shareholder action, this Article puts forward a
contingent shareholder action (and voting) system. This system allows the
shareholder to vote, or act, based on the actions of others. Under the
proposed contingent system, shareholders may still choose to cast a decisive
vote of “yes” or “no”, but they may also choose to vote contingently: vote
“yes” if, and only if, the aggregate non-contingent “yes” vote represents at
least a specified percentage of the shareholder votes, otherwise their vote is
“no.” To clarify, if no shareholder casts a decisive vote, then the condition
is not met, because less than the specified percentage of the votes were a
“yes” vote, and the contingent votes are treated as a “no” vote.
A contingent shareholder action regime may be flexible and allow the
condition to take various forms. The basic condition simply follows the
majority of non-contingent action. However, the condition can follow a
different threshold than a simple majority. For example, a shareholder action
can be contingent on at least 30% of the votes being cast unconditionally in
favor of the proposed shareholder action.
Consider the scenario in which a group of people is voting by show of
hands.41 The sequence starts with a few people who raise their hands first,
that suggests limiting the size of the board to about eight members in order to increase the
board’s effectiveness and describing supportive empirical evidence). But see Sanjai Bhagat
& Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long Term Firm
Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 261 (2002) (finding only “hints” to support the negative
connection between the board size and firm performance).
41. Historically, English common law provided that the default rule for voting at
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which reveals who supports the proposal strongly, and thus votes
immediately with no hesitation. After a short delay, additional hands are
raised following the lead of those who voted first. However, participating in
a shareholder meeting in person is costly, so shareholders may refrain from
doing so, and thus will not be able to follow the lead of those who raise their
hand first. In contrast, a shareholder meeting can be replaced by a vote by
written consent,42 or the shares can be voted by proxy,43 where the proxy is
instructed how to vote in advance of the meeting. In these scenarios, the
strong sentiments of shareholders who vote first is not revealed, the
shareholders lose the ability to inexpensively coordinate, exchange
information, and act as a group, thus requiring other means of
communication, such as proxy solicitation material or mandatory prior
disclosure, to disseminate the information to the shareholders.44 Conversely,
contingent shareholder action can be by proxy or in writing and still account
for the information about the simultaneous votes of other shareholders even
without attending the meeting in person. Contingent shareholder action can
help the shareholders achieve similar benefits of acting as a group at a lower
cost.45
shareholder meetings is by show of hands. See In re Horbury Bridge Coal, Iron & Waggon
Co., 11 Ch. D. 109, 109–10 (Del. Ch. 1879). A vote by show of hands counts the individual
shareholders that raise their hands, rather than their shares or the votes assigned to their shares,
and thus the votes are disproportionate to the equity holding of the shareholders. A vote by
show of hands, however, facilitates a quick voting result as the counting of the shareholder
votes is simplified. This common law has persisted, and currently, several countries, such as
Chile, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom
have laws that provide for shareholder voting by show of hands in certain situations. See
INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., MARKET MECHANICS GUIDE 3, 5, 7, 8, 9 (2020),
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/faq/market-mechanics-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/RTX
3-EB7E].
42. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (2020) (allowing action by written consent); MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.04 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1984) (current version at MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
7.04 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)) (requiring a unanimous vote for an action in writing rather than
in a meeting). The 2006 amendment of the Model Act followed Delaware and included a new
Section 7.04(b), which allows a corporation to add an article provision that departs from the
unanimous vote requirement. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.04(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2006)
(current version at MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.04(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)).
43. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (2020) (covering the Delaware proxy system);
Regulation 14A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 240.14b2 (2019) (setting forth the federal proxy rules).
44. Requiring certain shareholders to disclose their votes in advance so that other
investors could follow them is similar to Jesse Fried’s proposals to use mandatory advance
disclosure rules to allow shareholders to follow the lead of insiders and controlling
shareholders in the context of preemptive rights, repurchase tender offers, and insider trading,
see supra note 16.
45. To be sure, the large shareholders may have different risk tolerance profiles or
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The herd behavior incorporates the information disclosed by the
leaders. Since shareholder meetings are mostly attended by proxy,46 rather
than by retail investors,47 to replicate the scenario of being present in person
and being able to observe others and vote with a short delay, I suggest
adopting contingent voting.
Contingent shareholder action is
nondiscriminatory because every shareholder may choose to follow rather
than to lead, or vice versa. Shareholders may still abstain, so the proposed
contingent shareholder action regime does not necessarily increase the
weight of the vote of those who lead and vote decisively and unconditionally;
each shareholder is free to choose not to follow the lead of those who vote
unconditionally.
A contingent shareholder vote can be dependent on the majority of the
vote cast. This simple condition is similar to abstaining when a simple
majority of the vote cast is required. Whether the vote is cast in favor of the
majority or not, the outcome of the shareholder vote is the same: the majority
will prevail. Unlike a contingent shareholder vote, other contingent
shareholder actions, however, are different from shareholder abstention
since an action is actually required to exercise the right. For example,
abstention does not trigger preemptive rights,48 rather abstention is treated as
if the shareholder chose not to exercise her preemptive right, even if the
majority chose to do so.
If the proposed shareholder action is a fundamental transaction, which
can be, for example, a statutory merger,49 a sale of all or substantially all of

restrictions on investing, such as diversification requirements, which do not relate to their
nonpublic information about the stock price, and thus the retail investors should not
necessarily always blindly mimic the large shareholders’ behavior.
46. ERNST & YOUNG LLP, SEC FINANCIAL REPORTING SERIES: 2020 PROXY STATEMENTS
1 (2019), https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_us/topics/assurance/accounti
nglink/ey-sec07903-191us-12-09-2019-v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U58R-3LCC]
(“Most
shareholders do not attend shareholders’ meetings. Instead, they vote their shares on director
elections, major transactions and other matters via solicited proxies.”).
47. Physically attending such meetings might be prohibitively expensive for retail
investors.
48. Preemptive rights are rights to participate in future issuances of shares pro rata to a
shareholder’s percentage holding. For an analysis of preemptive rights and of their
shortcoming in protecting shareholders against cheap-stock tunneling by controlling
shareholders, see generally Fried & Spamann, supra note 12, at 6–24 (explaining that
preemptive rights cannot prevent cheap-stock tunneling when asymmetric information about
the value offered shares makes it impossible for the minority to know whether the shares are
cheap or overprices).
49. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2020).
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the assets of the company,50 an amendment of the charter,51 or dissolution,52
then the action will require the approval of the majority of the votes assigned
to the outstanding shares. If the shareholder action requires the majority of
the votes assigned to the outstanding shares, then abstaining is tantamount to
voting against the proposed shareholder resolution. This is because the
proposal requires the support of at least the majority (above 50%) of the
shareholder votes, regardless of the breakdown between votes cast against
the proposal and abstained votes. For example, if 100 votes are assigned to
the outstanding shares, 51 votes in favor of the shareholder action are
required to pass the proposal regardless of whether the remaining 49 votes
are cast against the proposal or not voted at all. To be sure, a large
shareholder opposition may affect the company due to negative publicity and
fear of future shareholder action,53 but the resolution will pass once it
receives the required 51 votes despite 49 votes in opposition. Similarly, if
only 50 votes are cast in favor of the resolution, then the resolution will fail
regardless of whether the remaining 50 votes are cast against the proposal or
are abstained; the resolution does not receive the required 51 “yes” votes,
and thus abstaining has the same effect as voting against the resolution. On
the other hand, if shareholders are allowed to vote contingently, 50 votes are
cast in favor of the resolution unconditionally and one vote is cast in favor
of the resolution contingent on the proposed resolution receiving more
unconditional “yes” votes than “no” votes, then this one vote will be added
to the “yes” votes. Thus, in this example, and the contingent vote will help
the proposal reach the required 51 votes.
On the other hand, if a plurality vote or a simple majority of the votes
cast is required for a shareholder action, then an “abstain” vote supports the
majority of those who voted, which could be either in favor of or against the
action. For example, if 100 votes are assigned to the outstanding shares and
30 votes are cast in favor of and 20 votes against the resolution, then whether
the remaining 50 votes are cast in favor of the resolution or are not voted at
all, the result is the same as long as they do not vote against the resolution.
50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (2020).
51. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2020).
52. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275 (2020).
53. Mira Ganor, Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L.
149, 152, 155 (2008) (“My study suggests shareholders are more potent than might appear
from a simple study of their formal rights . . . the shareholders may be able to steer the board
in informal ways toward the position they favor. For example, shareholders may use the
withholding vote mechanism and the media to pressure the board.”). See Floyd Norris,
Corporate Democracy and the Power to Embarrass, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at C1 for an
example of a successful vote-withholding tactic that cost Michael Eisner his chairman seat on
Disney’s board.
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Similarly, if 100 votes are assigned to the outstanding shares and 30 votes
are cast against and 20 votes in favor of the proposed resolution, then
whether the remaining 50 votes are cast against the resolution or abstain the
result is the same, as long as they do not vote for the resolution. A simple
contingent shareholder action that tracks the majority of the unconditional
vote cast is similar to abstaining from voting in these types of situations, as
it does not affect the outcome of the proposal. However, a contingent
shareholder action can be tailored in a way that does affect the outcome of
the resolution. For example, in the last scenario, where 30 votes are cast
against and 20 votes are cast in favor, if a shareholder who has 11 votes
decides to vote “yes” conditioned on at least 20 votes cast unconditionally
for the proposal, the 11 votes are added to the 20 votes for a total of 31 votes
in favor and only 30 against. This time the outcome is reversed and the
resolution passes.
From the point of view of the shareholders who have decided how to
vote regardless of the other shareholders’ actions (i.e., unconditionally),
contingent shareholder action is a regime that may be either welcomed or
disliked depending on the circumstances. There are scenarios in which
sophisticated investors would like other shareholders to follow their lead and
act in the same way as they do. For example, in situations where
sophisticated investors own less votes than are required to pass a shareholder
resolution or are needed to elect candidates to the board of directors in a
contested election or where the default plurality voting rule54 was replaced
by a majority requirement, the sophisticated investors require the support of
other shareholders to facilitate such shareholder action. Similarly, in the case
of appraisal rights, under the new Delaware de minimis exception, the
appraisal remedy is not available to shareholders of a public company if the
total appraisal claims represent only 1% or less of the outstanding shares and
the merger consideration for the shares whose owner seeks appraisal is only
$1 million or less.55 Thus, a small, sophisticated shareholder who seeks
54. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2020). A Delaware corporation can opt out of the
plurality default rule for the election of directors and replace it with a majority rule that could
require the majority of the votes cast, the majority of the votes present, the majority of the
votes outstanding, or a super-majority. And while fundamental transactions require approval
of the holders of the majority of the outstanding shares, other shareholder resolutions require
the approval of the holders of the majority of shares present in a meeting either in person or
by proxy. A charter provision can increase the majority required to pass a shareholder
resolution. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(4), 216, 251, 271 (2020).
55. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(g) (2020). See, COUNCIL OF THE CORP. LAW SECTION
OF THE DEL. STATE BAR ASS’N, SECTION 262 APPRAISAL AMENDMENTS 3 (Mar. 6, 2015),
https://www.appraisalrightslitigation.com/files/2015/03/DGCL-262-Proposal-3-6-15Explanatory-Paper-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/STB3-KS9S] (“If 99% of the stockholders accept
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appraisal, but does not reach the threshold set in the de minimis rule, may
benefit from other shareholders imitating her actions. Since the sophisticated
investors believe that the specific shareholder action is in their best interest
qua shareholders of the company, it is likely that it is also in the best interest
of the other unsophisticated shareholders.56 Thus, a small shareholder who
is entitled to appraisal rights can opt to exercise the right contingent on at
least another shareholder doing so unconditionally. In this case, contingent
voting can lead to an efficient outcome by lowering, or even obviating, the
solicitation and communication costs.
Conversely, in certain situations sophisticated investors would benefit
from going against the tide. For example, appraisal-arbitrage hedge funds57
invest in companies that are about to merge in order to benefit from the
relatively high pre-judgment interest rate, which they hope to receive in
appraisal proceedings.58 However, only if the holders of the majority of the
shares approve the merger, and thus will not be entitled to the appraisal
remedy themselves, will the hedge funds be eligible to ask the court to
appraise their shares.59 Another example is the case of a company that offers
to sell shares to its current shareholders for a price that reflects a higher
company valuation than the intrinsic value of the company (which can be
part of a public offering in which existing shareholders exercise preemptive
the merger consideration . . . it is difficult to justify the use of judicial and party resources to
provide a judicial determination of value.”).
56. To be sure, that may not always be the case. For example, the sophisticated
shareholders, especially those who own a relatively small stake in the company, might
simultaneously own a larger position in an investment that is negatively correlated with the
interests of the shareholders, such as shorting the company, owning shares of the competition,
or of a party on the other side of a transaction with the company. E.g., Ian Ayres & Joe
Bankman, Substitutes for Insider Trading, 54 STAN. L. REV. 235, 241–51 (2001) (analyzing
investments in rivals, suppliers, and customers based on material non-public information,
instead of direct investments in the corporation, in order to avoid insider trading); Bruce H.
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an Incentive Device, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 21, 48–51 (2006) (discussing shorting dominating competitors as mitigating the risks of
market entry).
57. Audra L. Boone, Brian J. Brougham & Antonio J. Macias, Merger Negotiations in
the Shadow of Judicial Appraisal 1 (Ind. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 381, 2019),
http://www.shareholderforum.com/appraisal/Library/20170919_Boone-BroughmanMacias.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS5D-87B8] (noting that the practice of hedge funds
“purchas[ing] shares in the target firm after a merger is announced and then perfect[ing] their
right to appraisal on the eve of the shareholder vote . . . [is] known as appraisal arbitrage”).
58. Cf. Scott Callahan, Darius Palia & Eric Talley, Appraisal Arbitrage and Shareholder
Value, 3 J. L. FIN. & ACCT. 147, 149 (2018) (“[I]n August of 2007, § 262(h) of the Delaware
code was amended to award presumptive pre-judgment interest in appraisal proceedings
pegged at the Federal Reserve discount rate plus five percent (5%), compounded quarterly.”).
59. Only shareholders who either abstained or voted against the transaction have
appraisal rights. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(g) (2020).
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rights),60 or offers to buy shares from its shareholders (stock buybacks or
self-tenders) for a price that is too low.61 The shareholders who choose not
to participate in these offers gain from the company’s actions at the expense
of the shareholders who do transact with the company (sell to or buy shares
from the company).62 Likewise, in the opposite situation, if the price is low
when the company issues shares, or high when it buys back shares,
sophisticated shareholders would like to benefit from dealing with the
company but would prefer that the other shareholders will not do the same,
in order to increase their own gain.63 Thus, the sophisticated investors would
not like the other shareholders to follow their buy/sell choices.64 The
unsophisticated investors, however, would benefit from mimicking the
sophisticated investors, who might be acting on insider information.65 As a
result, contingent voting may protect retail investors from abuse by insiders.
In a third set of cases, the sophisticated investors are generally
indifferent about the choices of the other shareholders. In these cases,
choices made by one shareholder do not affect the value of the other
shareholders; and thus, the sophisticated investors neither gain nor lose from
the other shareholders’ choices. For example, sophisticated shareholders of
a SPAC66 who exercise their right to redeem their shares on the eve of a
proposed acquisition transaction are, generally, not affected by the
redemption decision of the other shareholders of the SPAC.67 This is because
60. See, e.g., Fried & Spamann, supra note 12, at 3 (showing that preemptive rights
cannot prevent cheap stock tunneling when asymmetric information about the value of the
offered shares makes it impossible for the minority to know whether the shares are cheap or
overpriced).
61. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 16, at 453 (explaining that insiders can achieve
substantially the same result as tendering by selling their stock in the market after the RTO is
announced).
62. See Fried & Spamann, supra note 12, at 8 (showing that preemptive rights cannot
prevent cheap-stock tunneling when asymmetric information about the value of the offered
shares makes it impossible for the minority to know whether the shares are cheap or
overpriced); Fried, supra note 16, at 453–69 (explaining that insiders can achieve
substantially the same result as tendering by selling their stock in the market after the RTO is
announced).
63. This assumes that the total number of shares the company will sell/buy can be lower
than the total amount offered by the company; if the total amount cannot be lowered, then the
assumption is that the sophisticated shareholders can buy/sell shares in excess of their
percentage holding in case of undersubscription.
64. Another example where the actions of one investor may affect the other investors is
the case of reverse Dutch auction IPOs, such as the Google IPO. Cf. Mira Ganor,
Manipulative Behavior in Auction IPOs, 6 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 5, 8 (2007).
65. See Fried, supra note 12, at 98 (discussing the widely held belief that preemptive
rights can thwart cheap issuance tunneling by a controller).
66. For further discussion about SPACs, see infra Part III.A.
67. For situations where the sophisticated shareholders are affected nonetheless, see infra
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the SPAC funds that may be subject to redemption are held in escrow and
thus secure the ability of all the shareholders to redeem their shares
simultaneously.68 Remarkably, however, investors in SPACs can vote “yes”
on a management-proposed acquisition transaction and, nonetheless,
simultaneously choose to redeem their shares.69
To be sure, if the shareholders also own warrants of the SPAC, which
are not redeemable, the sophisticated investors would prefer that the other
shareholders did not redeem their shares and that the De-SPAC transaction
is effectuated, since it will increase the value of these warrants.70
Nevertheless, even if they do not have a direct interest in the transaction,
such as owning warrants, the shareholders may still wish to maintain a good
working relationship with the promoters and founders of the SPAC, who
seek to De-SPAC and advocate the transaction.71 Aiming to appease the
SPAC’s management, the sophisticated investors may refrain from
publicizing their plan to redeem their own shares and may well vote for the
transaction. Unsophisticated retail investors may not realize that they, as
well, will be better off if they redeem their shares even though the transaction
received the approval of the majority of the shareholder vote. Contingent
shareholder action will allow unsophisticated shareholders to see through the
shareholder approval of the merger transaction and follow the sophisticated
investors’ choice to redeem their shares, nonetheless.
To generalize, as seen in the scenarios above, the unsophisticated
shareholders can benefit from contingent action, while the sophisticated
shareholder may use the contingent action as an inexpensive yet credible
means of communication with the other shareholders.72
note 70 and accompanying text.
68. See infra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the transactional basics of
SPACs).
69. See infra note 85 and accompanying text (providing the registration statement for a
SPAC advised by Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P.).
70. SPAC Research, A Primer on SPACs, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 25, 2018),
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4165641-primer-spacs?page=5 [https://perma.cc/4AK7-FD
7A] (“[W]arrants will also expire worthless if no business combination is achieved.”).
Initially, investors purchase units, which include a combination of shares and warrants.
However, following the IPO, the shares and warrants usually trade separately on the stock
exchange. See infra notes 92–93 (discussing the approved Rule 19b-4 change and special
purpose acquisition companies).
71. See infra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing 2017 and 2018 SPAC market
trends).
72. To clarify, in VC-backed companies, the VC funds typically negotiate for various
contractual provisions such as tag along, drag along, co-sale, and oversubscription rights. The
scope and nature of these rights are based on the acts of the other shareholders. For example,
oversubscription rights allow the investors to purchase more shares in a round of financing if
other investors did not exhaust their preemptive rights. Contingent shareholder action, on the
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APPLYING CONTINGENT SHAREHOLDER ACTION

In the following subsections, I will apply contingent shareholder action
to two distinct situations to demonstrate how shareholders may benefit from
acting contingently. Subsection A will focus on the redemption rights, or the
rights to sell back the shares to the company, in the context of the new
generation of SPACs, and Subsection B will look at shareholder preemptive
rights, the right to participate in future issuances of stock by the company.
A. SPACs
Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) are vehicles used for
raising funds in initial public offerings (IPOs) to finance future acquisitions
of operating businesses that will be identified only after the IPO.73 Fittingly,
SPACs are also called “blank check” companies.74 SPACs’ importance has
increased in the last couple of years.75 In 2018, SPACs raised more than $10

other hand, is a method of exercising the shareholders’ rights based on the acts of the other
shareholders without changing the rights themselves.
73. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 80,199, File No. SRNYSE-2016-72, at 2 (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/2017/34-80199.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5HVU-YCG4] [hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 80,199] (“A SPAC
is a special purpose company that raises capital in an initial public offering (‘IPO’) to enter
into future undetermined business combinations through mergers, capital stock exchanges,
assets acquisitions, stock purchases, reorganizations or similar business combinations with
one or more operating businesses or assets.”). Special Purpose Acquisitions Companies
(SPACs), INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, https://www.nyse.com/spac [https://perma.cc/GZZ
4-BKRQ] (last visited Feb. 15, 2020) (“A special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) is
formed for the purpose of raising capital through an IPO and using those funds to
acquire an operating business.”); see Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 172, 224–28 (studying the SPACs phenomenon in the years 2003
through 2007); see generally, Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and
Reputation: The Evolution of SPACs, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849 (2013) (describing the evolution
of SPACs until 2013); see generally, Michael Klausner, Michael Ohlrogge & Emily Ruan, A
Sober Look at SPACs, (Stan. L. & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 559, 2021) (studying SPACs
that merged between 2019 and June 2020 and critiquing the structure and associated high
transaction costs).
74. Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 73, at 871.
75. Vincent G. Piazza, Evan Lee & Nathan R. Dean, SPACs Revisited: We Said It
Wouldn’t Be Any Different, BLOOMBERG PROF. SERVS. (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/spacs-revisted-said-wouldnt-different/ [https
://perma.cc/NNY7-LAW7] (“The importance of special purpose acquisition companies
(SPACs) in the capital-raising value chain has grown significantly over the past year. Private
equity is lending strong backing to the investment vehicle, especially in the energy sector.”);
Tse & Baker, supra note 9 (“[SPACs have] become more mainstream.”).
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billion,76 and over $13 billion in the following year.77 SPACs may offer
varied benefits to a company that seeks to go public, such as shortening the
approval process to get listed on the stock exchanges.78 SPACs are traded
on the most prominent stock exchanges, including both Nasdaq and the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE).79
Once the managers of the SPAC identify an acquisition target, they
need to obtain the shareholder approval to proceed with the transaction,
called a De-SPAC transaction.80 In accordance with the exchange listing
rules, shareholders who vote against the transaction have the right to redeem
their shares.81 Similarly, under Delaware law, a shareholder is entitled to
appraisal rights only if it “has neither voted in favor of the merger or
consolidation nor consented thereto in writing.”82 A shareholder who

76. Alexander Osipovich, Hot IPOs Present Pitfalls for Investors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27,
2019, at B1 (“SPACs . . . rais[ed] more than $10 billion in new listings last year.”).
77. Tse & Baker, supra note 9. The upward trend continues in 2020. See, e.g., Thorne
supra note 8 (“In 2020, SPACs have accounted for 38% of US IPO filings and raised $6.5
billion as of May 20—more than the total capital raised by institutionally-backed IPOs during
the period.”).
78. Tse & Baker, supra note 9 (“Merging with a SPAC can save a listing candidate
months or even a year compared with a regular IPO.”); SPAC Momentum Charges on with
Nikola, NASDAQ, (Jun 5, 2020) https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/spac-momentum-charges-o
n-with-nikola-2020-06-05 [https://perma.cc/VD98-VWQJ] (“A SPAC can offer a business a
faster process to going public with guidance from an experienced partner.”).
79. Osipovich, supra note 76, at B12 (“Since 2010, they have enjoyed another
resurgence, as well as increased acceptance on Wall Street. . . . Goldman Sachs Group Inc.
underwrote its first SPAC IPO in 2016. The New York Stock Exchange welcomed its first
blank-check company to the Big Board the next year. . . . Nasdaq Inc. has listed them since
2008.”); Special Purpose Acquisitions Companies (SPACs), supra note 73.
80. Exchange Act Release No. 80,199, supra note 73, at 3 (“Until the SPAC has
completed a business combination, or a series of business combinations, representing at least
80% of the trust account’s aggregate fair market value, the SPAC must, among other things,
submit the business combination to a shareholder vote. Any public shareholders who vote
against the business combination have a right to convert their shares of common stock into a
pro rata share of the aggregate amount then in the trust account, if the business combination
is approved and consummated.”). Alternatively, the SPAC may conduct a tender offer in lieu
of a shareholder vote, in order to prevent greenmail. NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL
§ 102.06(c) (2017) [hereinafter NYSE MANUAL].
81. Ramey Layne & Brenda Lenahan, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: An
Introduction, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 6, 2018), https://corpgov.law.ha
rvard.edu/2018/07/06/special-purpose-acquisition-companies-an-introduction/ [https://perma
.cc/AT7N-GULE] (“Under stock exchange listing rules, if a shareholder vote is sought, only
shareholders who vote against the De-SPAC transaction are required to be offered the ability
to redeem their public shares, but SPAC charter documents typically require the offer to be
made to all holders.”).
82. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2020).
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approves a merger transaction is not entitled to the appraisal remedy.83 Thus,
the law protects the shareholders who did not approve the transaction by
giving them redemption rights and appraisal rights.
However, while the listing rules require SPACs to give transaction
opponents the right to redeem their shares, the rules do not prohibit
transaction supporters from redeeming their shares as well.84 Typically, the
charter of the SPAC extends the redemption rights to all the common
shareholders, regardless of their vote.85 Thus, investors who opt to redeem
their shares and nonetheless vote in favor of the transaction have power over
the company, even though they choose to separate themselves from the
ownership interest that gives rise to these control rights a priori.
This practice of granting redemption rights regardless of the vote severs
the connection between the redemption request and the disapproval of the
proposed acquisition transaction.
A shareholder is allowed to
simultaneously vote for the transaction and ask for redemption, thus not
subjecting her own equity stake to the transaction she chose to support. It
seems to be a contradictory behavior for an investor to both ask to redeem
her investment at cost and, at the same time, approve the proposed
acquisition. Clearly, shareholders who choose to redeem their shares are not
optimistic about the prospects of the transaction, and yet they approve it.
One reason why sophisticated shareholders may vote for an acquisition,
yet choose to redeem their shares, is that everything else being equal, they
have nothing to gain from voting against the transaction and are likely to
upset its promoters if they do. Voting in favor of or against the De-SPAC
transaction will not affect the redemption value of the shares, since the
money is held in escrow, a trust that accumulates interest, and thus is
secured.86 However, if the sophisticated investors vote against the De83. But see In re Cyan, Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. CV 11027–CB, 2017 WL 1956955
at *17 (Del. Ch. May 11, 2017) (describing quasi-appraisal, a special remedy that the
Chancery Court gave shareholders who were misinformed, so that their approval was treated
as if not given because of the disclosure violation).
84. CHRISTIAN O. NAGLER & DAVID A. CURTISS, KIRKLAND & ELLIS, MARKET TRENDS
2017/18: SPECIAL PURPOSE ACQUISITION COMPANIES (SPACS), LEXISNEXIS 3 (2018), https://
www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/LexisNexis%20(SPAC%20-%20Nagler_Curtiss)
%20Aug%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/SGH2-2DTC] (“[S]tockholders may seek to have
their shares redeemed (regardless of whether they vote for or against the initial business
combination). . . .”).
85. Id.; see, e.g., Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Ltd., Registration Statement (Form
S-1) at 33 (Jun. 22, 2020) [hereinafter Pershing Square Registration Statement], https://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1811882/000119312520175042/d930055ds1.htm [https://perm
a.cc/2MWM-4E92] (“Each public stockholder may elect to redeem its shares of Class A
common stock irrespective of whether they vote for or against the proposed transaction.”).
86. WINSTON & STRAWN LLP, SPAC 101 TRANSACTION BASICS AND CURRENT TRENDS
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SPAC, their reputation in the market may suffer. Typically, the sponsors of
the SPAC are individuals with whom sophisticated shareholders would like
to maintain an amicable business relationship.87 The sponsors of the SPAC
own shares and warrants in the SPAC that are not redeemable and that will
be worthless if the SPAC does not consummate the De-SPAC transaction.88
Thus, retail investors cannot rely on the sophisticated investors’ vote and are
more vulnerable to management.
Alternatively, sophisticated shareholders may vote for an acquisition
because they want to redeem their shares without delay. The shareholders
have the right to redeem their shares in three events: (1) a consummation of
the De-SPAC transaction,89 (2) an extension of the period allotted for the
consummation of a De-SPAC transaction,90 and (3) a liquidation of the
company.91 If the sophisticated shareholders have lost confidence in the
SPAC, and the redemption value of their shares is higher than the price they
could receive for their shares in the market, then they may vote in favor of
the transaction. Failure to consummate the De-SPAC transaction will delay
13 (2018), https://www.winston.com/images/content/1/3/v2/135061/Winston-Strawn-SPACBasics-Presentation-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/PWZ6-ENK9].
87. See NAGLER & CURTISS, supra note 84, at 2 (“A SPAC is most often sponsored by
either (i) well known professionals in the specific industry or geography of focus for the SPAC
or (ii) private equity funds seeking acquisitions outside the focus of their general funds.”);
Osipovich, supra note 76, at B12 (“Wilbur Ross, the billionaire investor turned commerce
secretary, and entertainment entrepreneur Haim Saban . . . are among the executives who have
launched SPACs to seek acquisitions in recent years.”); Tse & Baker, supra note 9 (“[W]ellknown backers like blue-chip private equity firms and former public company CEOs involved
also has rehabbed the image of SPACs. . . . [B]illionaire Richard Branson did [a SPAC deal]
too.”).
88. WINSTON & STRAWN LLP, supra note 86, at 20 (“If unable to complete a business
combination within a specified timeframe, often 24 months from the closing of the IPO, it
must return all money in the trust account to the SPAC’s public shareholders, and the founder
shares and warrants will be worthless.”).
89. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 80, § 102.06(a) (“[I]f a shareholder vote on a Business
Combination is held, each public shareholder voting against the Business Combination will
have the right (‘Conversion Right’) to convert its shares of common stock into a pro rata share
of the aggregate amount then on deposit in the trust account (net of taxes payable, and amounts
disbursed to management for working capital purposes), provided that the Business
Combination is approved and consummated.”) (emphasis added).
90. Layne & Lenahan, supra note 81 (“[I]f the SPAC . . . seeks to amend its charter
documents to permit an extended period to consummate the De-SPAC transaction, it will . . .
offer to redeem.”); WINSTON & STRAWN LLP, supra note 86, at 20 (“In connection with any
extension, must offer public shareholders right to redeem shares for a pro rata portion of the
cash held in the trust account.”).
91. Layne & Lenahan, supra note 81 (“SPACs are required to either consummate a
business combination or liquidate within a set period of time after their IPO. Stock exchange
rules permit a period as long as three years, but most SPACs designate 24 months from the
IPO closing as the period.”).
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the redemption of the shares until another redemption opportunity
materializes.
In addition, it may be in the sophisticated investors’ interest to DeSPAC even if it is better for them to redeem their SPAC shares. In the IPO,
the SPAC issues units that include both common stock and warrants to
purchase common stock.92 These units trade separately shortly after the
IPO.93 While it may be that from the perspective of a shareholder the deal is
undesirable, it still may be that for an option holder, the economics is
different.94 Unlike the shares, the warrants are not assigned redemption
rights, and rejection of the De-SPAC transaction may trigger a liquidation of
the SPAC, which will erase the value of the warrants. On the other hand,
approval of the De-SPAC transaction preserves the option value of the
warrants. Thus, as a shareholder, the investor is not in favor of the
transaction, but as a warrant holder, she stands to gain from the De-SPAC
transaction. While the voting rights are assigned to the shares, and the
warrants do not confer voting rights on their owners, the investors may use
their votes to increase the value of their warrants.95
Another explanation of this seemingly contradictory behavior of a
shareholder who both votes in support of the transaction and exercises her
redemption rights may be that she has a conflicting interest, such as owning
shares of the target of the SPAC acquisition.96 It may also be that the
investors who wish to redeem their shares believe that they will be paid faster
if fewer investors ask to exercise their redemption right. All the funds
subject to the redemption right are held in escrow, thus the investors should
not be concerned with a “run for the bank” situation that may leave them

92. Exchange Act Release No. 80,199, supra note 73 (“[I]n the IPO, a SPAC typically
sells units consisting of one share of common stock and one or more warrants (or fraction of
a warrant) to purchase common stocks. The units are separable at some point after the IPO.”).
93. Layne & Lenahan, supra note 81 (“Following the IPO, the units become separable,
such that the public can trade units, shares, or whole warrants, with each security separately
listed on a securities exchange.”). Interestingly, in the case of Bill Ackman’s hedge fund’s
proposed $3 billion SPAC IPO of Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Ltd., the shares include
in addition to detachable warrants, rights for special warrants that are not detachable and
cannot be traded separately from the shares and will be cancelled if the shares are redeemed,
clearly giving the investors some economic incentive not to redeem the shares. See Pershing
Square Registration Statement, supra note 85, at 15.
94. Cf. Hu & Black, supra note 35 (describing situations in which shareholders have
voting rights though they have interests that are foreign to the interests of the shareholders as
a whole, for example because they have shorted the stock of the company).
95. Cf. Hu & Black, supra note 35.
96. Cf. Hu & Black, supra note 35, at 830 (“Empty voting on the acquirer’s side by the
target’s shareholders, employed if the vote is likely to be close, could reduce whatever
constraint the vote requirement now instills on the acquiring firm.”).
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with less than their rightful claim.97 However, a distribution to numerous
investors, and especially a failure to approve the De-SPAC that might trigger
a dissolution of the SPAC, may delay the distribution of funds for the
redeemed shares.
The unsophisticated investors, however, may misinterpret the approval
of the transaction by the majority of the shareholders’ vote as a sign that the
sophisticated investors support the transaction because they believe it is in
their best interest as shareholders, and thus the unsophisticated investors may
choose not to redeem their shares. And where the shareholder vote decreases
in its significance, or even becomes meaningless, as in the case of some dual
class capital structures,98 the retail shareholders who need to decide whether
to redeem their shares are left vulnerable and ill-equipped. Even if they
understand that the vote of the shareholders cannot be interpreted as a clear
indication in favor of the transaction, the unsophisticated shareholders lose
the signal that such shareholder vote is supposed to confer and are left
vulnerable to transactions that benefit the SPAC sponsors at the expense of
the unsophisticated shareholders.
An alternative explanation of the shareholders’ choice to redeem their
shares and vote for the transaction may be unrelated to their personal
sentiment about the De-SPAC transaction. The shareholders may realize that
different investors may have different risk tolerance levels and may favor
more risk than they do. Thus, they may refrain from blocking the transaction
and enable the other shareholders to proceed with the acquisition.99 To be
sure, a shareholder may choose to abstain from voting on the transaction,
rather than voting in favor, once she decides to exercise her right to redeem
her shares because at this time the decision no longer affects her.
Interestingly, the old exchange listing rules prohibited De-SPAC
transactions that accompanied redemption requests representing 40% or
more of the common stock.100 In 2010, Nasdaq, with the SEC’s approval,

97. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (describing the basics of SPAC structure
and current trends).
98. See, e.g., Pershing Square Registration Statement, supra note 85, at 32 (noting that
to approve a transaction, the sponsor will need less than 38% of the votes assigned to the
shares proposed to be issued in the public offering).
99. Cf. Piazza, Lee & Dean, supra note 75 (“[T]he risk of liquidation of the structure is
driven by equity redemption and the hurdle of completing an acquisition.”).
100. Exchange Act Release No. 80,199, supra note 73, at 4 (“[T]he Exchange is proposing
to eliminate the provision that prevents a business combination if public shareholders owning
a threshold amount (not to exceed 40%) of the shares of common stock issued in the IPO
exercise their conversion rights in connection with the business combination.”).
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repealed this prohibition.101 The NYSE did the same in 2017.102 Perhaps not
coincidentally, an increase in SPAC IPOs followed these repeals.103
However, after the De-SPAC transaction, the company will still be subject
to the exchange continued listing rules, including the minimum number of
shareholders requirement,104 thus increasing the importance of the number of
redeeming shareholders.
The various explanations of shareholder behaviors described above
demonstrate why the vote of the sophisticated investors on the De-SPAC
transaction cannot be taken as a signal for the merit of the transaction, nor
does it necessarily reflect the best interest of the shareholders as a whole.
For this reason, we may not want retail investors to mimic the sophisticated
investors’ votes about the De-SPAC. However, mimicking the sophisticated
investors’ decision regarding the exercise of their redemption rights may
serve to benefit the retail investors.
Contingent shareholder action may protect retail investors of SPACs.105
They may choose to redeem their shares if a certain percentage of
101. Exchange Act Release No. 80,199, supra note 73 at 11, n.28 (“Further, the Exchange
has also proposed to eliminate the provision that a business combination cannot be
consummated by the SPAC if the public shareholders owning in excess of a threshold amount
(to be set no higher than 40%) of the shares of common stock exercise their conversion rights.
The Commission notes that we have approved SPAC listing rules on other markets that do
not contain a similar requirement. The Commission notes that it has previously approved a
substantially similar rule concerning this portion of the Exchange’s proposal for other national
securities exchanges.”) (citations omitted).
102. Exchange Act Release No. 80, 199, supra note 73 at 11, n.28.
103. See Piazza, Lee & Dean, supra note 75.
104. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 80, §§ 102.01A, 802.01B. These sections require at least
400 round lot holders, excluding holders who serve as officers or directors (i.e., 400 holders
of at least 100 shares each) following the De-SPAC transaction. It should be noted that the
SEC recently rejected a NYSE’s proposed rule that would have given the exchange:
discretion to allow SPACs a reasonable time period following a business
combination to demonstrate compliance with the applicable quantitative listing
standards . . . rather than requiring SPACs to immediately comply with such
standards . . . including the requirement to maintain a minimum of 400 round lot
holders.
Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-86117, File No. SR-NYSE2018-46, at 4 (June 14, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/2019/34-86117.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/MVW5-JJAS].
105. An additional solution may be to prohibit shareholders from redeeming the shares
that voted for the transaction, similar to the appraisal rights rules, which link the shareholders’
rights to their actions. See supra text accompanying note 59; Cf. Scott Edward Walker,
Demystifying the VC Term Sheet: Pay-to-Play Provisions, VENTUREBEAT (May 9, 2011, 6:00
AM), https://venturebeat.com/2011/05/09/demystifying-the-vc-term-sheet-pay-to-play-provi
sions/ [https://perma.cc/U8EL-866R] (describing pay-to-play rights, whereby if an investor
does not participate in future rounds of investments, then she loses voting rights).
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shareholders choose to redeem shares unconditionally, thus withdrawing
their support for the company regardless of the outcome of the shareholder
vote about the De-SPAC transaction. Contingent shareholder action allows
retail investors to piggyback on the sophisticated investors’ knowledge and
research. To be sure, unless the sophisticated investors are abusing insider
information, the contingent action allows the retail investor to free ride on
the legitimate efforts of the sophisticated investors. This is similar to the free
riding that occurs as a result of mandatory disclosure requirements that are
imposed on insiders or large investors.106
The contingent shareholder action can take many forms and use
different thresholds. For example, the shareholder may decide that if holders
of at least 30% of the shares redeem their shares unconditionally, then she
too will redeem all of her shares; and if less than 30% redeem their shares,
but more than 20% choose to redeem their shares unconditionally, then she
will redeem only half of her shares; and finally, if less than 20% redeem their
shares, she will not redeem any of her shares. This can be achieved,
technically, by dividing the shares and using different thresholds: a 20%
threshold for one-half of the shares and a 30% threshold for the other half of
the shares.107
B. Preemptive Rights
Preemptive rights are shareholder rights to participate in new issuances
of stock by the company.108 In one of his seminal contributions to the
literature on corporate governance and preemptive rights, Jesse Fried shows
that these rights are not as protective as they may seem in preventing dilution
of shareholders.109 In fact, insiders may exploit their non-public information
about the company to extract value from the shareholders, by strategically
106. Generally, it might be efficient if large shareholders invest in private research and
analysis based on publicly available information as part of their monitoring activities, which
cost they solely internalize. Being able to benefit disproportionally from the results of the
analysis might incentivize the large investors to conduct such research.
107. For example, suppose a shareholder owns 100 shares. She can divide her shares into
two, place a contingent redemption call with a threshold of at least 30% of shares being
redeemed unconditionally on 50 of her shares, and place a contingent redemption call with a
threshold of 20% on the other 50 shares.
108. Ganor, supra note 14, at 738–39; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(3) (2020)
(permitting the grant of preemptive rights in the certificate of incorporation under Delaware
law).
109. Fried, supra note 12, at 81; see also Fried & Spamann, supra note 12, at 1 (explaining
that preemptive rights can make “cheap-stock tunneling” more difficult, the rights cannot
prevent cheap stock tunneling when asymmetric information makes it impossible for the
minority to know the true value of the stock).
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participating in buybacks or in new issuances (exercising preemptive rights)
only when the price the company offers is favorable to them and refraining
from doing so in other times.110 On the other hand, due to the inability to
determine the real value of the stock, outside shareholders may make the
wrong decision when choosing whether to participate in these transactions.111
Fried further shows that a mandatory disclosure requirement can solve this
problem by forcing the insiders to make public their plans to participate or
to refrain from participating in the company’s proposed sale, thus allowing
the rest of the shareholders to mimic the insiders’ decisions.112
However, while mandatory disclosure may solve the abuse of insider
information by controlling shareholders, it creates a set of new challenges.
For one, mandatory disclosure comes with a cost: it requires the actual
dissemination of the disclosed information to the shareholders and the
processing of the information by the outsiders, if they decide to incorporate
the new information in their decision-making process. Mandatory disclosure
requirements may also discourage potential investors from accumulating a
sizeable stake in a company to avoid triggering disclosure requirements that
make their choices public. The contingent shareholder action, on the other
hand, can be used as an alternative instrument to mandatory disclosure rules
that does not entail the same costs as mandatory disclosure rules, though
contingent shareholder action may also be used as a complementary tool.113
Applying contingent shareholder action to preemptive rights cases
could take the form of a pro rata limit subscription commitment. This means
that the holders of the preemptive rights may choose to buy up to a certain
amount of shares in the offering, provided that the actual number of shares
bought by them will not represent a higher percentage of the total aggregate
commitments than the holders’ ex-ante stake in the company.114 For
110. Fried, supra note 12, at 91.
111. Fried, supra note 12, at 81 (“[F]ear of buying overpriced securities will cause some
outsiders to rationally refrain from purchasing, and these refraining outsiders will suffer losses
if the securities are, in fact, cheap. On the flip side, participating outsiders will suffer
losses . . . when the securities’ price is, in fact, high.”).
112. Fried, supra note 12, at 98.
113. See infra Part IV for a comparison of mandatory disclosure rules and contingent
shareholder actions.
114. A pro rata limit subscription commitment is similar to using a limit order to buy stock
through a brokerage firm. While the limit order focuses on the price, the pro rata limit
subscription commitment focuses on the number of shares. Both help protect the investor by
restricting the purchase order in response to the market. See, e.g., Investor Bulletin: Trading
Basics, Understanding the Different Ways to Buy and Sell Stock, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
1 (Mar. 2011), https://www.sec.gov/files/trading101basics.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TA4-PYB
R] (“A buy limit order can only be executed at the limit price or lower. . . . While limit orders
do not guarantee execution, they help ensure that an investor does not pay more than a
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example, if the shareholder owns 10% of the company, under contingent
shareholder action, the shareholder may choose to exercise her preemptive
rights and commit to purchasing a specified number of shares in the offering,
but with a ceiling of no more than 10% of the total actual issuance. Placing
a pro rata limit subscription commitment means that the shareholder commits
to purchase the lesser of the specified number of shares and the limit. The
limit protects the outsider shareholder by adjusting her commitment to reflect
the size of the actual number of shares issued in the rights offering.
If all the outsiders put a pro rata limit on their commitment that matches
their pro rata share of the company prior to the new issuance, and the
controlling shareholder does not participate in the offering, without new
investors, the rights offering will not close. For example, if the controlling
shareholder owns 30% of the company115 and the company receives an
aggregate commitment for only 70% of the offering, but with a limit that it
will represent not more than 70% of the total issuance, then this is equivalent
to a commitment contingent on actually selling 100% of the offer, and thus
the offer fails.
To be sure, the limit to the commitment can be set higher than the actual
pro rata share of the preemptive right holder. In the previous example, this
can be a commitment to purchase 70% of the offered shares provided that
the purchased shares will represent not more than 80% of the total
commitments. Setting a higher limit may account for nonparticipating
outsiders and accommodate outsiders who wish to increase their holdings,
regardless of the controlling shareholder’s actions.
Investors may decide to purchase shares even if they learn that the
controlling shareholder or other insiders will not participate in the offering.
The fact that the insiders are already invested in the company may carry
sufficient weight and influence enough investors who attribute the
nonparticipation of the insiders to portfolio diversification needs and
liquidity constraints rather than negative insider information. In addition, if
underwriters agree to a firm commitment rights offering, then even if the
controlling shareholder does not participate or only partially participates, the
predetermined price for a stock.”).
115. A shareholder can control the company despite owning less than 50% of the equity
of the company. A dual class capital structure, for example, may confer direct control to a
shareholder who owns less than the majority of the shares through the ownership of superior
voting rights. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis,
Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency
Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE
OWNERSHIP 445, 445–60 (Randall K. Morck, ed., 2000). Similarly, a shareholder may gain
de facto control over the company, despite controlling less than 50% of the votes, if the
shareholder base is dispersed. Ganor, supra note 31, at 181.
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underwriters will make sure that the rights offering closes and buy any
unsubscribed shares.116 Thus, despite the use of a pro rata limit subscription
commitment, with the help of underwriters and new investors, the offering
may still close without insider participation. Nonetheless, the existing
outsider shareholders who use contingent shareholder action to maintain
their percentage holding in the company after a rights offering are neither
better nor worse off, regardless of whether the controlling shareholder
participates in the offering, and even if the offering is underpriced.117 It may
be though, that the existing outsider shareholders will incur liquidity and
diversification costs in order to maintain their percentage holding and
participate in the offering.118
In a contingent shareholder action regime, the accepted commitments
are the commitments that result in the highest accepted commitment
subscription without violating the limit restrictions. We might end up with
no solution, in which case the offer will not close. This is similar to a
mandatory disclosure regime and a scenario where the controlling
shareholder does not participate, and the outsiders, mimicking the
controlling shareholder, also do not participate, and thus the offer does not
116. If the underwriting is a firm commitment, then the underwriter undertakes to step in
and purchase any shares that are not bought in the offering. Firm Commitment Underwriting,
NASDAQ: GLOSSARY OF STOCK MARKET TERMS (2018), https://www.nasdaq.com/investing/gl
ossary/f/firm-commitment-underwriting [https://perma.cc/RR6N-N8ER] (“An underwriting
in which an investment banking firm commits to buy and sell an entire issue of stock and
assumes all financial responsibility for any unsold shares.”).
117. To the extent that the shareholder maintains her percentage holding in the company,
the gains and losses will offset each other: if the rights offering is overpriced, then she will
win from the increase in value of the old, pre-offer purchased shares and lose from purchasing
the new over-priced shares. Alternatively, if the rights offering is underpriced, then she will
lose from the decreased value of the old shares and win from participating in the underpriced
rights offering. For example, to demonstrate the offsetting effect of using preemptive rights
to maintain the percentage holding of the shareholder, consider a company that has 100 shares
issued and outstanding and is worth $100, which means that each share is worth $1.
Shareholder A owns 10 shares, which are worth $10 total. The company issues 100 new
shares for the low price of $0.50 a share. The total proceeds from the new issue of shares is
$50, so the new value of the company is now $150 and the capital of the company is divided
into 200 shares with each share worth $0.75. Following the new issue of shares, Shareholder
A’s old 10 shares are worth $7.50, which reflects a loss of $2.50 in the value of the shares
before the new issue of shares. However, if Shareholder A participates in the share offer pro
rata to her percentage holding in the company and buys 10% of the new issue, or 10 new
shares, for a total of $5, then these new shares will be worth $7.50 immediately after the
closing of the offer, incorporating a gain of $2.50, which offsets the loss on the old shares.
118. Ganor, supra note 14, at 739 (“[P]reemptive rights give only the right to participate
in future issuances of shares, but the shareholders’ ability to participate in the issuance of
shares may in itself be limited. . . . A shareholder may not want or be able to invest more in
the company. . . .”).
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close.119
The following example illustrates the process for determining the size
of the total accepted subscription commitments in a contingent shareholder
action regime. Suppose the company is offering to sell up to 100 shares. 𝑋
is defined as the highest aggregate accepted commitments that do not violate
the limit-subscriptions. Generally, there can be three types of subscription
commitments under the limit rule, regardless of whether they are made by
an insider or outsider. The first type is a no-limit subscription commitment.
As an example, for this type of commitment, consider Shareholder A who
makes a commitment to buy up to 30 shares unconditioned on the behavior
of the other shareholders.
The second type is a limit subscription commitment with a limit set at
or below the subscription. For example, Shareholder B commits to buy up
to 20 shares, provided that she will not end up buying more than 20% of the
total accepted commitments. This means that if 20 is more than the limit,
20% ∗ 𝑋, then Shareholder B buys only 20% ∗ 𝑋 shares. Given that the total
offer is only 100 shares, then this type of offer can be simply rewritten as
20% ∗ 𝑋.
The third type of commitment is a limit subscription commitment with
a limit set above the subscription. Consider, for example, Shareholder C
who wants to buy up to 15 shares, provided that she does not end up buying
more than 20% of the total accepted commitments. In other words, if 15 is
greater than 20% ∗ 𝑋 then the subscription is in the size of 20% ∗ 𝑋,
otherwise the subscription will be for 15 shares. This condition means that
as long as 𝑋 ≥ 75 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠, (15 < 20% ∗ 𝑋 → 𝑋 > 15/20%), then
Shareholder C’s commitment is 15 shares; and if 𝑋 < 75, (15 > 20% ∗ 𝑋),
then Shareholder C’s commitment is 20% ∗ 𝑋 shares. We calculate the
critical value, 75 in this example, for each commitment of the third type. The
following table summarizes the subscription commitments of the three
shareholders.

119. Cf. Fried, supra note 12, at 98–99 (indicating in a mandatory disclosure regime, if a
controlling shareholder refrains from purchasing any securities, there can be no cheapissuance tunneling, as the controller will not acquire any securities, while overpriced issuance
tunneling will be curbed as outside investors will infer the securities are not cheap if the
controlling shareholders refrain from purchasing them).
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shareholder action may allow a shareholder to follow groups of investors,
not just an individual insider who is subject to the mandatory disclosure
requirement. Contingent shareholder action may help an individual retail
investor to decide what to do with the information from the mandatory
disclosure. Contingent shareholder action may help avoid the cost associated
with reviewing the disclosures made pursuant to a mandatory disclosure
requirement, gleaning additional information about the disclosing party, and
reaching an educated decision based on this information. The following
subsections outline a few differences between contingent shareholder action
and mandatory disclosure rules from a cost-benefit perspective.
A. Equal Treatment
Similar to contingent shareholder action, mandatory disclosure rules
allow the shareholders to follow those shareholders who are targeted by the
disclosure requirement under a mandatory disclosure regime.122 However,
contingent shareholder action’s significant advantage over a disclosure
requirement regime is that the former treats all the shareholders equally and
does not impose a special obligation on any specific, targeted shareholders.
If the intent of the disclosure is to allow the minority shareholders to mimic
a controlling shareholder’s actions,123 then a contingent action that is
structured as a choice to exercise the shareholder’s rights, if the majority of
the shareholder rights are exercised unconditionally, achieves the same
result. In other words, a mandatory disclosure rule targets specific, but not
all, shareholders and requires them to disclose their choices. On the other
hand, a contingent action regime treats all shareholders equally and does not
require disclosure by any shareholder. And yet, a similar result is achieved
by allowing the shareholders to follow those who choose to exercise their
rights unconditionally.
To be sure, transparency is valuable in certain situations and may be
beneficial to management, as it increases confidence in the governance of
the firm and contributes to a perception of fairness, especially when it is
applied equally. Unequal treatment of shareholders may be justifiable where
it is needed to protect the shareholders from abuse of a fiduciary position and
from trading based on insider information. On the other hand, both equal
treatment of shareholders and confidential shareholder action (including
confidential voting) benefit the firm by attracting investment from
shareholders who may not wish to expose their choices. Contingent
122. Fried, supra note 12, at 81.
123. Fried, supra note 12, at 81.
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shareholder action may also encourage voting and enable management to
gauge the real sentiments of the shareholders and expose potential opposition
early on, before a crucial vote is needed. Before a vote is crucial, the
shareholders may just vote with management to avoid friction that may arise
in case the identity of those who voted against is disclosed. Alphabet Inc.,
Google Inc.’s parent company, for example, assures its shareholders that it
maintains their vote confidentially within the organization as well as vis-avis third parties.124 It should be noted that Alphabet Inc. is controlled by its
founders, who own the majority of the vote through a dual class capital
structure.125 Nonetheless, favorable shareholder vote is still important, even
where the management enjoys effective control,126 in order to avoid bad
publicity due to lack of support from investors127 and in cases where a
majority of the minority vote128 or a class vote129 is required.
Furthermore, shareholders who are targeted by a mandatory disclosure
regime can also benefit, like the rest of the shareholders, from a contingent
shareholder action regime and should be allowed to act contingently on the
choices of the other shareholders. Even though the mandatory disclosure
regime singles out the targeted shareholders and forces them to disclose their
actions in advance, for example, because of the size of their holding,130 they
too should be able to use a contingent shareholder action. For example, the
regime should allow the targeted shareholders to use contingent shareholder
124. Alphabet Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 14 (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www
.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1652044/000130817918000222/lgoog2018-def14a.htm [https:/
/perma.cc/8QES-UEM7] (“Proxy instructions, ballots, and voting tabulations that identify
individual stockholders are handled in a manner that protects your voting privacy. Your vote
will not be disclosed either within Alphabet or to third parties, except: (1) as necessary to
meet applicable legal requirements, (2) to allow for the tabulation of votes and certification
of the vote, and (3) to facilitate a successful proxy solicitation.”). It should be noted, however,
that the term “successful proxy solicitation,” in the context it is used in Alphabet’s voting
privacy notice above, is rather vague and potentially weakens the ability of the notice to assure
shareholders.
125. Google, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), supra note 32, at iii. For a
description and analysis of the use of a dual class capital structure by Google Inc., see Ganor,
supra note 31, at 169–70.
126. See Ganor, supra note 31, at 182.
127. See supra text accompanying note 53.
128. See cases cited supra note 20 (identifying Delaware case law where a vote of the
majority of the minority was required to avoid entire fairness judicial review).
129. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2020) (requiring the approval of the
holders of the majority of a class for changing the number of authorized shares of the class).
130. See infra note 133 and accompanying text (explaining that under 17 C.F.R. §
240.13d-1(a), a targeted investor that holds more than five percent of a company must file a
Schedule 13D with the SEC and disclose their position within ten days of reaching the five
percent threshold).
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action in order to maintain their percentage holding in the company in case
of a rights offering and place a pro rata limit subscription commitment.131
B. Simultaneous Action, Cost, and Delay
In addition to avoiding discriminating against a group of shareholders,
the contingent system is advantageous in comparison to a mandatory
disclosure rule because it saves time and expenses. The mandatory
disclosure rule requires an early action by the insider or controlling
shareholder, which is in turn followed by the distribution of the information
to the shareholders who then are requested to act. The contingent system, on
the other hand, asks all the shareholders to exercise their rights
simultaneously, and there is no need to inform the shareholders about the
actions of the insider prior to their own. The contingent system allows the
shareholders to factor in the insider’s actions without actually learning about
it in advance.
Requiring the insider to disclose her choices ahead of time, in order to
allow the outsiders to mimic her actions, has a built-in delay: first the insider
discloses her chosen action, then the outsiders, after learning about the
insider’s choice, decide whether or not to mimic the insider’s action. This
delay may come with a cost to the company, for example, of disseminating
the insider’s choice to the rest of the shareholders, and a cost to the insider
having less time to make the decision. On the other hand, a shareholder
contingent action can be done simultaneously, with no delay, because there
is no need to tell the other shareholders what the insiders are doing ahead of
time. Both the insiders and the outsiders submit their choices at the same
time.
A retail investor may choose to follow the majority of the decisive
action, saving the cost of educating herself about who the insiders are, who
the sophisticated investors are, what each of them is doing, what action
management recommends, and so on. Choosing to follow the majority of
the non-contingent vote is an easy, fast, and costless solution that may lead
to the same favorable result for the retail investor as following a previously
disclosed insider action.

131. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (providing a quantitative example of how
existing shareholders can use contingent shareholder action to maintain their percentage
holding).
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C. Insider Identity, Multiple Insiders, and Capture of Unknown
Players
Mandatory disclosure rules focus on the identity of the shareholder.
However, if we knew that a shareholder is an insider and owns, for example,
30% of the shares, then we could design our contingent action accordingly
and follow the acts of at least a 30% decisive action. This action should lead
to the same result as following the mandatorily disclosed actions of insiders.
To be sure, a mandatory disclosure requirement is important in the case of a
very small insider, such as an officer who does not own a significant
percentage of the equity of the company, because her acts might fall off the
radar of a contingent shareholder action regime.
If there are multiple insiders and each act differently, the
unsophisticated investors who learn about the behavior of the insiders may
be puzzled and incapable of deciding whom to follow. In the case of
preemptive rights, for example, contingent shareholder action allows the
shareholders to protect their investment, without picking sides, by
maintaining their percentage holding in the company, and thus neither
winning nor losing from the share offering.132 Adding a pro rata limit option
to the shareholder action lets the outsiders maintain their percentage holding
in the face of varied and confusing insider behavior.
Additional information can be gleaned from the actions of shareholders
who choose to act non-contingently. A contingent regime allows for the
capture of non-contingent actions of players who are unidentified by the
market at the time. For example, the securities laws allow a delay of up to
ten days for disclosure after a person acquires more than 5% of the
company.133 Similarly, investors may purposefully stay below the 5%
threshold in order to avoid triggering disclosure requirements.134 A
contingent regime allows less sophisticated shareholders to follow the

132. See supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text.
133. Filing of Schedules 13D and 13G, Exchange Act Rule 13d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d1(a) (2019); see also Form of Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2019) (promulgating
the information to be included in Rule 13d-1 disclosures).
134. Maintaining anonymity may be beneficial for investors for a myriad of reasons,
including avoiding a premature price increase that will follow such disclosure. Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 50 (2012) (“Once the presence of an outside blockholder is publicly
disclosed, prices rise to a level reflecting [the] expected benefits” of “the blockholder’s
[future] monitoring and engagement activities.”).
But see Mira Ganor, Toehold
Collaborations Beyond Insider Trading, 14 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 187, 227–28 (2017)
(analyzing special toehold collaborations that are strategically disclosed to the public in order
to deter competing bidders).
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actions of shareholders who are not yet subject to mandatory disclosure
requirements.
If we do not know that a shareholder has insider information, she may
not be subject to mandatory disclosure rules. However, the contingent
shareholder action regime will nonetheless allow the shareholders to follow
the unconditional acts of shareholders without knowing the identity or
relationship of the shareholder who acted decisively. A sophisticated
investor may have information that is unknown to the public as a whole but
does not fall within the scope of insider information as defined. Thereby,
acting upon it does not violate the securities rules, and in which case, it is
beneficial for the unsophisticated investors to follow the acts of the
sophisticated investor even if they do not know her identity.135
V.

PREVENTING CIRCUMVENTION

Subsection II describes a few scenarios in which a shareholder does not
want the other shareholders to follow her actions136 because generally, acting
differently from the other shareholders allows her to reap extraordinary
profits, usually at the expense of the company and the other shareholders.
Both contingent shareholder action and mandatory disclosure allow the other
shareholders to follow the lead of the resolute shareholder and act similarly
towards her.
Thus, shareholders may strategically camouflage their actions in order
to attempt to prevent the other shareholders from following them. One such
strategy may be to collaborate with other investors rather than act as a single
large shareholder, and thus try to avoid triggering disclosure rules and
regulatory focus.137 However, under the securities regulations, if the
investors act as a group, they will be viewed as a single person, thus
subjecting the group to the disclosure requirements.138 Similarly, contingent

135. On the other hand, from the sophisticated investor’s point-of-view, being followed
may or may not be desirable, depending on the case. See supra text accompanying notes 54–
64.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 57–64.
137. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund
Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 562 (2016) (“Avoiding joining a
‘group’ protects those activist investors who individually own less than 5% of the target’s
stock, because the target will usually not know of their existence. Unless these investors
declare themselves part of a group, they are basically invisible so long as they individually
stay below the 5% ownership level.”).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (2012) (“When two or more persons act as a . . . group for the
purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate or group
shall be deemed a ‘person’ for the purposes of this subsection.”).
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shareholder action tracks aggregate non-contingent action, and thus is
indifferent to the formal split of the ownership among group members.
In an attempt to circumvent the ability of the shareholders to mimic her
action in a corporation that allows for contingent shareholder action, the
shareholder can choose to use a significantly low contingency threshold and
split her action. To see how this strategy may work, consider a shareholder
who owns 5% of the shares of the company. The shareholder can use a small
fraction of her shares, for example only 0.01% of the shares, unconditionally.
She will use her other 4.99% of shares to act contingently on at least 0.01%
non-contingent shareholder action—a low bar that she herself clears. This
will result with seemingly only 0.01% determined non-contingent action.
Such low percentage of unconditioned action may be dismissed and not
followed by any shareholders, as it may appear to reflect an insignificant
interest in the company.
To prevent this strategic shareholder action from camouflaging her real
action, low bar contingent action should be treated as non-contingent action.
To avoid circumventing the contingent shareholder action regime, an action
should be considered non-contingent if it is contingent on a significantly low
percentage, so that the insiders cannot partially act unconditionally and
partially act contingently based on a low percentage that tracks their own
actions.
CONCLUSION
Retail shareholder power to act is often illusory, and without the
knowledge how and when to use it, it might be worthless. The law deals
with this problem mainly by imposing mandatory disclosure requirements
and by relying on fiduciaries that owe the duty to promote the shareholders’
best interests through guidance and active abuse prevention. This Article
puts forward a different solution—the contingent shareholder action, which
enables shareholders to follow sophisticated investors without the expense
of processing disclosed information and is particularly useful in cases such
as redemption decisions in SPACs.
Contingent shareholder action does not rely on potentially conflicted
fiduciaries to promote shareholder interests. By enabling shareholders to
place a cap on their actions, such as a pro rata limit for example, it can
prevent dilution in situations where shareholders face choices such as
whether to exercise preemptive rights or whether to participate in stock
buybacks. In addition, contingent shareholder action can solve structural
coercion situations where shareholders are coerced to vote against their
better judgement in fear of ending up worse off in case of collective action
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failures.
While an investor might be able to give her broker proxy instructions
to vote in a contingent way, such contractual arrangement will not have the
same desired effects as the contingent shareholder action regime proposed in
this Article. To carry out contingent voting instructions, the broker should
be able to see how the other shareholders are voting. While the broker knows
how her other clients instructed her to vote their shares, she does not see how
all the company’s shareholders, including shareholders who are not her
clients, are voting. Thus, a contingent shareholder action regime should be
permitted by law and administered on a company-wide level.
Further study should look into the effects of contingent shareholder
action on ancillary rights of shareholders. For example, shareholders who
have the right to vote on a merger transaction may have statutory appraisal
rights, but only if they do not vote in favor of the merger. In a contingent
shareholder action regime, the shareholder may use her right to vote
contingently. One may look at this choice similarly to a decision to abstain
from voting, and thus the shareholder should maintain her appraisal rights.
On the other hand, as the Article shows, in certain scenarios, a contingent
action is different from abstention, and thus one might look at the choice of
voting contingently as a delegation of the decision to other shareholders and
as a step closer to approval of the merger than merely abstaining, which may
justify the loss of appraisal rights.

